



BETWEEN
THEATER
&
ANTHROPOLOGY

RICHARD SCHECHNER

FOREWORD BY VICTOR TURNER

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS • PHILADELPHIA



2

RESTORATION OF BEHAVIOR

Restored behavior is living behavior treated as a film director treats a strip of film. These strips of behavior¹ can be rearranged or reconstructed; they are independent of the causal systems (social, psychological, technological) that brought them into existence. They have a life of their own. The original "truth" or "source" of the behavior may be lost, ignored, or contradicted—even while this truth or source is apparently being honored and observed. How the strip of behavior was made, found, or developed may be unknown or concealed; elaborated; distorted by myth and tradition. Originating as a process, used in the process of rehearsal to make a new process, a performance, the strips of behavior are not themselves process but things, items, "material." Restored behavior can be of long duration as in some dramas and rituals or of short duration as in some gestures, dances, and mantras.

Restored behavior is used in all kinds of performances from shamanism and exorcism to trance, from ritual to aesthetic dance and theater, from initiation rites to social dramas, from psychoanalysis to psychodrama and transactional analysis. In fact, restored behavior is the main characteristic of performance. The practitioners of all these arts, rites, and healings assume that some behaviors—organized sequences of events, scripted actions, known

texts, scored movements—exist separate from the performers who “do” these behaviors. Because the behavior is separate from those who are behaving, the behavior can be stored, transmitted, manipulated, transformed. The performers get in touch with, recover, remember, or even invent these strips of behavior and then rebehave according to these strips, either by being absorbed into them (playing the role, going into trance) or by existing side by side with them (Brecht’s *Verfremdungseffekt*). The work of restoration is carried on in rehearsals and/or in the transmission of behavior from master to novice. Understanding what happens during training, rehearsals, and workshops—investigating the subjunctive mood that is the medium of these operations—is the surest way to link aesthetic and ritual performance.

Restored behavior is “out there,” distant from “me.” It is separate and therefore can be “worked on,” changed, even though it has “already happened.” Restored behavior includes a vast range of actions. It can be “me” at another time/psychological state as in the psychoanalytic abreaction; or it can exist in a nonordinary sphere of sociocultural reality as does the Passion of Christ or the reenactment in Bali of the struggle between Rangda and Barong; or it can be marked off by aesthetic convention as in drama and dance; or it can be the special kind of behavior “expected” of someone participating in a traditional ritual—the bravery, for example, of a Gahuku boy in Papua New Guinea during his initiation, shedding no tears when jagged leaves slice the inside of his nostrils; or the shyness of an American “blushing bride” at her wedding, even though she and her groom have lived together for two years.

Restored behavior is symbolic and reflexive: not empty but loaded behavior multivocally broadcasting significances. These difficult terms express a single principle: The self can act in/as another; the social or transindividual self is a role or set of roles. Symbolic and reflexive behavior is the hardening into theater of social, religious, aesthetic, medical, and educational process. Performance means: never for the first time. It means: for the second to the *n*th time. Performance is “twice-behaved behavior.”

Neither painting, sculpting, nor writing shows actual behavior as it is being behaved. But thousands of years before movies rituals were made from strips of restored behavior: action and stasis coexisted in the same event. What comfort flowed from ritual performances. People, ancestors, and gods participated in simultaneously having been, being, and becoming. These strips of behavior were replayed many times. Mnemonic devices insured that the performances were “right”—transmitted across many generations with few accidental variations. Even now, the terror of the first night is not the presence of the public but knowing that mistakes are no longer forgiven.

This constancy of transmission is all the more astonishing because

restored behavior involves choices. Animals repeat themselves, and so do the cycles of the moon. But an actor can say no to any action. This question of choice is not easy. Some ethologists and brain specialists argue that there is no significant difference—no difference of any kind—between animal and human behavior. But at least there is an “illusion of choice,” a feeling that one has a choice. And this is enough. Even the shaman who is called, the trancer falling into trance, and the wholly trained performer whose performance text is second nature give over or resist, and there is suspicion of the ones who too easily say yes or prematurely say no. There is a continuum from the not-much-choice of ritual to the lots-of-choice of aesthetic theater. It is the function of rehearsals in aesthetic theater to narrow the choices or at least to make clear the rules of improvisation. Rehearsals function to build a score, and this score is a “ritual by contract”: fixed behavior that everyone participating agrees to do.

Restored behavior can be put on the way a mask or costume is. Its shape can be seen from the outside, and changed. That’s what theater directors, councils of bishops, master performers, and great shamans do: change performance scores. A score can change because it is not a “natural event” but a model of individual and collective human choice. A score exists, as Turner says (1982a, 82–84), in the subjunctive mood, in what Stanislavski called the “as if.” Existing as “second nature,” restored behavior is always subject to revision. This “secondness” combines negativity and subjunctivity.



Put in personal terms, restored behavior is “me behaving as if I am someone else” or “as if I am ‘beside myself,’ or ‘not myself,’ ” as when in trance. But this “someone else” may also be “me in another state of feeling/being,” as if there were multiple “me’s” in each person. The difference between performing myself—acting out a dream, reexperiencing a childhood trauma, showing you what I did yesterday—and more formal “presentations of self” (see Goffman 1959)—is a difference of degree, not kind. There is also a continuum linking the ways of presenting the self to the ways of presenting others: acting in dramas, dances, and rituals. The same can be said for “social actions” and “cultural performances”: events whose origins can’t be located in individuals, if they can be located at all. These events when acted out are linked in a feedback loop with the actions of individuals. Thus, what people in northern Hindi-speaking India see acted out in Ramlila tells them how to act in their daily lives; and how they act in their daily lives affects the staging of the Ramlila. Mythic enactments are often regarded as exemplary models. But the ordinary life of the people is expressed in the staging, gestures, details of costume, and scenic structures of Ramlila (and other folk performances).

Sometimes collective events are attributed to "persons" whose existence is somewhere between history and fiction: the Books of Moses, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer, the *Mahabharata* of Vyas. Sometimes these actions and stories belong anonymously to folklore, legend, myth. And sometimes they are "original," or at least attributable to individuals: the *Hamlet* of Shakespeare, the *Ramcharitmanas* of Tulsidas, the *Oedipus* of Sophocles. But what these authors really authored was not the tale itself but a version of something. It's hard to say exactly what qualifies a work to belong to, and come from, a collective. Restored behavior offers to both individuals and groups the chance to rebecome what they once were—or even, and most often, to rebecome what they never were but wish to have been or wish to become.

The restoration of behavior model (figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4) is processual, describing emergent performances from the point of view of rehearsal. Figure 2.1 shows restored behavior as either a projection of "my particular self" ($1 \rightarrow 2$), or a restoration of a historically verifiable past ($1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$), or—most often—a restoration of a past that never was ($1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$). For example, interesting as the data may be, the "historical Richard III" is not as important to someone preparing a production of Shakespeare's play as the logic of Shakespeare's




Figure 2.1

text: the Richard of Shakespeare's imagination. Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 elaborate the basic idea; I will discuss these elaborations later. A corollary to the basic thesis is that most performances—even those that apparently are simple $1 \rightarrow 2$ displacements or $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ re-creations—are, or swiftly become, $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$. For it is this "performative bundle"—where the project-to-be, 5_b , governs what from the past is selected or invented (and projected backward into the past), 5_a —that is the most stable and prevalent performative circumstance. In a very real way the future—the project coming into existence through the process of rehearsal—determines the past: what will be kept from earlier rehearsals or from the "source materials." This situation is as true for ritual performances as for aesthetic theater. Even where there are no rehearsals in the Euro-American sense, analogous processes occur.

Figure 2.1 is drawn from the temporal perspective of rehearsal and from the psychological perspective of an individual performer. "Me" (1) is a person rehearsing for a performance to be: 2, 4, or 5_b . What precedes the performance—both temporally and conceptually—is either nothing that can be definitely identified, as when a person gets into a mood, or some definite antecedent event(s). This event will either be historically verifiable (3), or not (5_a). If it is not, it can be either a legendary event, a fiction (as in many plays), or—as will be explained—the projection backward in time of the proposed event-to-be. Or, to put it another way, rehearsals make it necessary to think of the future in such a way as to create a past. Figure 2.1 is divided into quadrants in order to indicate mood as well as temporality. The upper left




Figure 2.2




Figure 2.3

quadrant contains mythic, legendary, or fictional events. The mood is subjunctive. In Turner's words:

Here cognitive schemata that give sense and order to everyday life no longer apply, but are, as it were, suspended—in ritual symbolism perhaps even shown as destroyed or dissolved. . . . Clearly, the liminal space-time "pod" created by ritual action, or today by certain kinds of reflexively ritualized theatre, is potentially perilous. [1982a, 84]

This past is one that is always in the process of transformation, just as a papal council can redefine Christ's actions or a great twentieth-century Noh performer can introduce new variations into a fifteenth-century *mise-en-scène* of Zeami's.

The lower left quadrant—that of the actual/indicative past—is history understood as an arrangement of facts. Of course, any arrangement is conventionalized and conditioned by particular world and/or political views. Events are always rising from the lower left to the upper left: today's indica-




Figure 2.4

tive becomes tomorrow's subjunctive. That's one of the ways human experience is recycled.

The lower right quadrant—the future/indicative—is the actual performance-to-be-enacted. It is indicative because it actually happens. It is in the future because the figure is conceived from the temporal perspective of a sequence of rehearsals in progress: in figures 2.2 and 2.3, "me" is moving along with rehearsals from the left to the right.

There is nothing in the upper right quadrant—the future/subjunctive—because performances are always actually performed. But one might place some workshops and Grotowski's paratheater there, as a sequence $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_c$. Paratheater and workshops are preparations and process implying performances that never-will-be. The paratheatrical work goes along "as if" there might be a performance, an end to the process; but the process doesn't end, it has no logical finality, it simply stops. There is no performance at point 5_c .

In $1 \rightarrow 2$ I become someone else, or myself in another state of being, or mood, so "unlike me" that I appear to be "beside myself" or "possessed by another." There is little rehearsal for this kind of performance, sometimes none. From birth, people are immersed in the kind of social performative actions that are sufficient preparations for entering trance. Watching children, infants even, at a black church or in Bali reveals a continuous training by osmosis. The displacement of $1 \rightarrow 2$ may be slight, as in some mood changes, or very strong, as in some trances. But in either case there is little appeal to either an actual or a subjunctive past. "Something happens" and the person (performer) is no longer himself. This kind of performance, because it is so close to "natural behavior" (maybe extraordinary from the outside but expected from within the culture)—either by surrender to strong outside forces, as in possession, or by giving in to moods within oneself—can be very powerful. It can happen to anyone, suddenly, and such instant performative behavior is regarded as evidence of the strength of the force possessing the subject. The performer does not seem to be "acting." A genuine if temporary transformation (a transportation) takes place. Most $1 \rightarrow 2$ performances are solos, even if these solos happen simultaneously in the same space. The astonishing thing about Balinese sanghyang trance dancing is that each dancer has by her/himself so incarnated the collective score that solo dances cohere into group performances. Upon recovering from the trance, dancers are often unaware that others were dancing; sometimes they don't remember their own dancing. I've seen similar meshing of solo performing into an ensemble several times at the Institutional Church in Brooklyn. As the gospel singing reached a climax more than a dozen women, men, and children "fell

out" into the aisles. People watched them closely, grabbing them if they became too violent, preventing them from knocking against the chairs, calming them down when the singing subsided. The same kind of assistance is offered to trance dancers in Bali and elsewhere. The event in Brooklyn is very neatly organized. The singers whose gospel fired the trance dancing were definitely not in trance. They were the "transporters" propelling the dancers into trance. The dancers depended upon their friends to keep the dancing safe. The others in the church—potentially trance dancers but for the time being either more or less involved in the action—filled out a continuum from cool spectators to nearly wholly entranced clappers, foot stompers, and shouters. Each trance dancer was dancing in trance alone, but the whole group was dancing together, the whole church was rocking with collective performative energy. Peter Adair's film of a snake-handling, white, fundamentalist Christian sect in West Virginia, *The Holy Ghost People*, shows the same thing.

In $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ an event from some other place or past is restored—a "living newspaper" or a diorama at the American Museum of Natural History. Strictly speaking, dioramas are restored environments, not behaviors. But increasingly action is being added to the environments. Later I will discuss "restored villages" and "theme parks" where fact and fancy are freely mixed. Some zoos, however, try their best to make their displays genuine replicas of the wild. Reacting to the vanishing wilderness, zoo keepers are creating "breeding parks."

In the breeding park near Front Royal, Virginia, the attempt to keep an authentic and pristine environment is such that all visitors except breeders, veterinarians, and ethologists are excluded. At the San Diego Wild Animal Park in the lovely hills thirty miles northeast of the city, there is a combination of authenticity and local cultural values (shtick). Those riding the monorail around the 600-acre display are repeatedly reminded by the tour guide of the authenticity of the park. The brochure all visitors get begins:

Join us here . . . to contemplate the wild animals of the world and nature's wilderness . . . to strengthen a commitment to wildlife conservation throughout the world . . . and to strive toward man's own survival through the preservation of nature.

Of course, there are adjacent to the monorail "wild preserve" a number of food stands, souvenir stores, and theaters offering animal shows (trained birds, a petting pen, etc.). Also, the park features nightly concerts of jazz, bluegrass, calypso, and "big band sounds." There is a McDonald's. This same brochure invites the more spendy visitors to "Join us for a tempting 10-ounce Delmonico steak dinner at Thorn Tree Terrace each evening, and take a new

Caravan Tour into the preserve." Oh, well. But what interested me most was when I asked the monorail guide what the lions "roaming free" ate? Special food pellets packed with everything nutritious. Why not some of the wildebeests running across the fence from the lions? Well, I was told, although there is no shortage of wildebeests and lions do hunt them back in Africa, it would take too much space and, maybe, it wouldn't be so nice for the monorail visitors to witness such suppers. In this way, $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ is transformed by specific cultural values into $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$. The whole tone of the Wild Animal Park is of peaceful cohabitation. The hunting behavior of carnivores, though known, is not seen. The 5_a that the park restores is consistent with current California notions of how best "to contemplate . . . nature's wilderness."

Many traditional performances are $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$. So are performances that are kept in repertory according to a strict adherence to the original score. When the Moscow Art Theatre visited New York in the mid-sixties, it claimed to present Chekhov according to Stanislavski's original mise-en-scènes. When I saw several plays of Brecht at the Berlin Ensemble in 1969 I was told that Brecht's Modelbuchs—his detailed photo accounts of his mise-en-scènes—were followed. Classical ballets have been passed on through generations of dancers. But even the strictest attempts at $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ frequently are in fact examples of $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$. $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ is very unstable, simply because even if human memory can be improved upon by the use of film or exact notation a performance always happens within several contexts, and these are not easily controllable. The social circumstances change—as is obvious when you think of Stanislavski's productions at the turn of the century and the Moscow Art Theater today. Even the bodies of performers—what they are supposed to look like, how they are supposed to move, what they think and believe—change radically over relatively brief periods of time, not to mention the reactions, feelings, and moods of the audience. Performances that were once current, even avant-garde, soon become period pieces. These kinds of contextual changes are not measurable by Labanotation.² The difference between $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ and $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ is shown in figure 2.2. In $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ there is an event (3) that is always referred back to. This event serves as model and corrective. If during a rehearsal of one of Brecht's plays, according to his authorized mise-en-scène, it is suspected that some gesture is not being performed as Brecht intended it, the gesture is checked back against the Modelbuch (and other documentary evidence). What the Modelbuch says goes. It is the authority. All details are checked against an "authorized original." Many rituals follow this pattern. This is not to say that rituals—and Brecht's mise-en-scènes—do not change. They change in two ways: first, by a slow slippage made inevitable by changing historical circum-

stances; second, through "official revisions" made by the owners-heirs of the "authorized original." In either case, it is my view that $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ is very unstable: it is always becoming $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$.

Noh drama is a very good example of a performance genre that is both $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ and $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ simultaneously and consciously. The whole score of a Noh play—its mise-en-scène, music, text, costuming, masking—is transmitted within several schools or families from one generation to the next with only minor variations. In this sense, Noh—at least since the Meiji Restoration of the nineteenth century—is a clear example of $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$. During his lifetime a Noh shite (the main actor, literally the "doer," the one who wears the mask) moves from one role to another in a progression; the accumulation of roles equals a full career. He accepts the score of the role he approaches and leaves behind the score of the role he has just played. Only the greatest masters of Noh dare change a score. These changes are taught by the shite to his disciples: the changes become part of the score. The roles, and their place within the total performance text, and the performance texts themselves as steps along the progression of Noh plays that compose a lifetime of performing make up a complicated but decipherable system. But each individual Noh performance also includes surprises. The groups who come together to do a Noh play are made of members of different families, each with its own traditions, its own "secrets." The shite and chorus work together; the waki, kyogen, flutist, and drummers work separately. That is, if a Noh play is done according to the tradition the ensemble does not gather until a few days before the performance. Then no rehearsals occur; instead, the shite outlines his plans. True to its Zen aspect, a Noh drama staged traditionally occurs only once, finding in the absolute immediacy of the meeting among all its constituent players its essence. Like the Zen archer, the shite and his colleagues either hit the mark or they don't.


During the performance—through subtle signals issued by the shite to the musicians and others—variations occur: routines are repeated or cut, emphases changed, tempos accelerated or slowed. Even the selection of what costume and mask to wear sometimes depends on the shite's opinion regarding the mood of this audience assembled now. The shite gauges the mood of the audience by watching them assemble or by seeing how they react to the first plays of a full Noh program that may include five Noh and four comic kyogen plays and take seven hours or more. Those Noh performers made into a "company" for foreign tours, where they repeat the same plays over and over, performing with the same players, complain of boredom and the lack of creative opportunity. Optimally, then, each performance of Noh, and every variation during a performance, is the leading edge of a long tradition formed during Kanami's and Zeami's time in the four-

teenth and fifteenth centuries, almost extinguished by the mid-nineteenth, and flourishing again now. This leading edge is both $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ and $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$.

Some contemporary experimental theater in New York also combines $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ and $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, but in a way that suggests the configuration $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 5_b$: the restoration in a subjunctive mood of a past that is demonstrably factual. In *Rumstick Road* of the Wooster Group, actual sound tapes of Spalding Gray interviewing his father, grandmother, and mother's psychiatrist are played as part of a reminiscence that presents Gray's state of mind regarding his mother's life and suicide. Techniques used in *Rumstick Road*—dancelike movements, direct address to the audience, a progression of events organized according to associational rather than linear narrative conventions, performers sometimes playing themselves and sometimes playing characters—all are well established in experimental Euro-American theater. But the core documents used in *Rumstick Road*—the audiotapes, letters and photographs that Gray found in his father's house—are used "raw," as is. Robert Wilson in his work with Raymond Andrews, a deaf boy, and Christopher Knowles, a brain-damaged boy (or one unusually tuned to experience, depending on one's view of the matter), similarly introduces "raw" material and behaviors into highly "artified" performances. Squat Theatre—with the back wall of its stage actually being a window directly facing busy Twenty-third Street in Manhattan—also combines the raw, the unrehearsed or untreated, with the highly refined (or processed). Of course, what's raw from one perspective may be refined from another. How can Twenty-third Street be raw nature, or maybe it is raw human nature—or is that a contradiction in terms? (For more on this problem, see chapter 7 and Schechner 1982b.)

Just as interesting as Noh or experimental performance in regard to the relationship between $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ and $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ types of restored behavior is Shaker dancing. Carol Martin in her 1979 paper, "The Shakers: Sources and Restoration," introduced me to the complexities of the Shaker story. The Shakers were a religious sect who migrated from England to America in 1774. Since Shakers do not marry, their numbers depend entirely on conversions. As of 1983 there were only six surviving Shakers, all of them aged. But around the time of the Civil War there were about six thousand. Shaker ritual included song and dance (plate 7). Originally these were done by and for the Shakers themselves. But according to Suzanne Youngerman:

as Shakerism grew, the religion and the social organization it engendered became less ecstatic and more rigid and institutionalized. The dances and songs, which were the main form of worship, also changed from involuntary ecstatic and convulsive movements with glossolalia occurring during spells of altered states of consciousness to disciplined choreographed marches with symbolic steps, gestures, and floor plans.



7. Shakers dancing, based on a color lithograph of Anthony Imbert, ca. 1826. Photo courtesy of the New York Public Library.

8. Doris Humphrey's *The Shakers* as danced in 1938. Photo by Barbara Morgan.



These rituals became elaborate and fixed dance "exercises." A steady stream of tourists came to the Shaker communities to watch these spectacles. [1978, 95]

The Shakers had stopped dancing by 1931 when Doris Humphrey, one of the pioneers of American modern dance, choreographed *The Shakers* (plate 8). Working from pictures and research materials but never having seen any Shakers dancing, Humphrey in her dance was able to actualize something of Shaker culture. Youngerman says: "Humphrey's choreography embodies a wide range of Shaker culture incorporating many direct references to actual Shaker dances" (1978, 96). Dance scholar Marcia Siegel told me that after *The Shakers* people regarded Humphrey as an authority on Shakers; she received letters concerning them and her advice was solicited. But it wasn't until 1955 that Humphrey even met a Shaker.

Humphrey's dance was in the repertory of the José Limon Dance Company where I saw it performed in 1979 and 1981. The Limon company is the inheritor of Humphrey's approach to dance. The dance is also Labanotated, which means other companies can dance Humphrey's dance much the way orchestras can play a Beethoven symphony. In fact, in 1979 the Humphrey dance was performed by the Louisville Ballet at Shakertown, a

9. "Shaker Service" as reconstructed/restored by the Liberty Assembly. Copyright © 1983 by the Liberty Assembly.



reconstructed Shaker village at Pleasant Hill, Kentucky. This is certainly not the only example of an aesthetic dance being a main way of physically re/membering (= putting back together what time has dis/membered) an extinct behavior. Shakers dancing is $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$; Humphrey's *Shakers* is $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$.

Dance scholar Dorothy Rubin suggests another "route" around the model depicted in figure 2.1. I have shown Rubin's route in figure 2.4. Rubin worked on what she calls "recreating" seventeenth-century English masque dances. Data concerning these dances are incomplete, yet there is some information available. What the "recreations" do is use what historical information there is (3), to build a model of what the masque dances might have been (5_a), and then to perform these (5_b).

Since we are recreating and not merely reconstructing or restoring, I propose that the continuum start at the "me," move through the primary sources concerning the actual event, 3, progress to the "reconstruction"—i.e., primary sources + educated guesses to fill in the gaps, 5_a , flow through the "me," 1, (all decisions made both in reconstructing and rehearsing), and culminate at the "recreation," 5_b . [Rubin 1982, 10]

I like Rubin's variation of the model. Not only does it yield important processual information, but it demonstrates the flexibility of the model itself.

The Shaker story continues. Figures 2.1 and 2.4 illuminate it. Robin Evanchuk visited a few surviving Shakers in 1962 and again in 1975. These people had long since stopped dancing. By using their memories and the memories of people who knew Shakers and by drawing on the research of Edward Deming Andrews,³ Evanchuk reconstructed the "authentic" dances. As of 1977 three groups had "learned and presented this reconstruction," including her own group, the Liberty Assembly (plate 9). Evanchuk is always bringing in new dancers. This requires orientation and rehearsal.

During the teaching sessions, the dancers must overcome their fear of appearing ridiculous due to the strangeness of movements and the intense emotion. In addition to a strong orientation, I find that constant repetition of the movements, which allows the dancers to gradually become familiar with them, tends to lessen their embarrassment and moves the emphasis from how the dancers feel to concern for how the Shakers themselves felt when they were involved in the exercises. [Evanchuk 1977-78, 22]

Thus we have three different but related performance traditions: the Shakers themselves (now gone), an art dance choreographed by Humphrey that is still performed by the Limon company and others, and an "authentic" reconstruction of Shaker dancing by Evanchuk. Of the first of these traditions—Shaker dancing in the nineteenth century—I can say nothing, but I guess

that it was of the $1 \rightarrow 2$ or $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ type, soon becoming $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, as tourists visited the Shakers to watch them dance. This same conversion of a performance genre from something focused inward on a community to something broadcast outward to tourists is widespread; I've seen it in India and Bali. Clearly Humphrey's *Shakers* is $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$. But Evanchuk always refers back to 3, an "authorized original." If after some rehearsals she finds her dancers departing from the original, she corrects them. Still it is hard to categorize the Evanchuk restoration as $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$. She works by referring back to an authorized original, but she also states that it is her wish to restore not just Shaker dances but Shaker feelings as well: the fervor, joy and ecstasy that go with the dancing. Humphrey doesn't call her dance an ethnographic reconstruction, and Evanchuk doesn't call her work art. But Humphrey achieved something other than fiction; anthropologist Youngerman thinks Humphrey's dance comes close to expressing the heart of the sect. Youngerman reports that

one of the last two Shaker brothers, Ricardo Belden, then 87 years old, saw the 1955 reconstruction of *The Shakers* at Connecticut College and reportedly was "enthralled" by the performance. He later wrote to Humphrey offering to come to New London the following summer to teach Shaker dances. What greater tribute could there be? [1978, 106]

Evanchuk used the notes of this same Ricardo Belden. It would seem to me that Evanchuk's reconstructions are actually $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, evolving out of $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ or Rubin's $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$. The determining factor is whether or not a performance is based on previous performances. In cultures where performances are transmitted orally, is not the process of transmission very much like Humphrey's process in making *The Shakers*? The authority in such cultures rests not with "data" or "documented" earlier performances but with "respected persons" who themselves, in their very bodies, carry the necessary performance knowledge. The original is not fixed, as in Evanchuk's notes (or, ironically enough, in the Labanotated *Shakers*), nor is it in quasi-literary texts; it is in bodies that pass on not only the "original" but their own particular incarnation/interpretation of that original.

$1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ is a performance based on previous performances. The totality of all those previous performances as incorporated in the oral tradition may be called the "original." The people possessing the latest version of the original often presume (falsely) that it has come down unchanged over many generations. Unlike a specific performance text of Brecht's or a particular Labanotated dance of Humphrey, the Evanchuk reconstruction of Shaker dancing is founded on her own construction of what Shaker dancing was. This construction is based on several sources, including the memories of

surviving Shakers. Evanchuk says she is restoring "authentic" Shaker dances. I ask: Which dances, performed on which occasions, before what audiences, with what dancers? Humphrey's original *Shakers* is $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, while new productions following the Labanotated score of that original are $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$. The Evanchuk "authentic" Shaker dancing is more likely to be $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, for the original Evanchuk is looking at is not "an" original at all but a bundle of performances—and nonperformances (documents, memories, etc.)—conventionally labeled "an" original.

But even where there is "an" original—as in Brecht, the Moscow Art Theatre Chekhovs, and Humphrey's *Shakers*—contextual and historical circumstances make even the exact replication of a scored/notated original different than the original. Hard as it may be for some scholars to swallow, performance originals disappear as fast as they are made. No notation, no reconstruction, no film or videotape recording can keep them. What they lose first and most importantly is their immediacy, their existence in a specific space and context. Media recording abolishes these almost totally. Restorations are immediate, and they exist in time/space as wholes; but the occasion is different, the world view is different, the audience is different, and the performers are different. One of the chief jobs challenging performance scholars is the making of a vocabulary and methodology that deal with performance in its immediacy and evanescence. Even now, most discourse on the subject has been adapted from considerations of literature—where the argument can be made that originals exist and persist. Not so with performances, where the closest one can get to an original is the "most recent performance of . . ." Technically the Moscow Art Theatre productions of Chekhov, the Berlin Ensemble productions of Brecht, and the Limon company's production of *The Shakers* are $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$. But in actuality—in the immediacy of their being performed now—all these performances are $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$.

Other examples of $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ are theater when the mise-en-scène is developed during rehearsals; ethnographic films shot in the field and edited at home; modern versions of "ancient forms," whether or not labeled "neoclassical" or "restorations" or "recreations"; and rituals that actualize,⁴ commemorate, or dramatize myths or old stories (though probably it's the other way around; myths follow, are word versions of, elaborations based on, rituals). In $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$, the event to be restored either has been forgotten, never was, or is overlaid with so much secondary stuff that its actuality-in-history is lost. History so-called is not "what happened" but what has been constructed out of events, memories, records: all shaped by the world view of whoever—individually or collectively—is encoding (and performing)

history. To "make history" is not to do something but to do something with what has been done.

History is not what happened but what is encoded and transmitted. Performance is not merely a selection from data arranged and interpreted; it is behavior itself and carries in itself kernels of originality, making it the subject for further interpretation, the source of further study.

$1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ is unstable due to the difficulty of "fit." It is not possible to "get back to" what was. 4 can never match 3. As I noted, performers' bodies are different, audiences are different, performative contexts are different. $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ replaces $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4$ because rehearsals (or whatever preparatory steps are followed) conflate the past, present, and future. The work of rehearsals is to "re-present" a past for the future (performance-to-be). Performers repeat yesterday's work at today's rehearsal on behalf of the future "presentation." This synchronic aspect of $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ is shown in figure 2.3, suggested to me by Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett. Figure 2.3 shows that the pastness of 5_a is focused through the prism of "today's rehearsals" and projected forward to the project-to-be, 5_b . It is always this project-to-be that sets up the rules or conditions for selecting material from 5_a . 5_a and 5_b cannot function independent of each other.

Carol Martin and Sally Harrison both examined figure 2.1 and suggested using the upper right quadrant, the future/subjunctive. They pointed out that a route $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_c$ would describe the process of Grotowski's paratheater, some of Allan Kaprow's more recent happenings where there is no public, and the many workshops that use theatrical and dance techniques with no view toward public performance at all. Some of these workshops are therapeutic (dance therapy and psychodrama). But others fall into the category of aesthetics, or workshops run for "personal growth." This last is hard to pin down beyond saying that therapeutic techniques are used not to "cure" people but to extend their range of self-expression, to help them relate to each other, and simply as a source of pleasure. Thus some workshops use the performance process but not in the service of generating public performances. Sometimes not only are performances forbidden but workshopers are told to keep what happened in workshops secret.

The model of the performative process shown in figures 2.1–2.4 is drawn from a Euro-American perspective. I will apply it to events that are not Euro-American. In doing so, I am not saying that the performances of many different cultures are equivalent. But I do think that performances in all cultures share the particular quality of twiceness that the model depicts, that performances everywhere are restored behavior. And I think restored behavior can best be understood processually by examining the rehearsal

process: how the single behaved behaviors of ordinary living are made into the twice-behaved behaviors of art, ritual, and the other performative genres. I'm aware of the opinion of Goffman and others that "ordinary living" includes a lot of performing. Insofar as it does, the model applies. Maybe it is that art and ritual are more than "twice-behaved." Or maybe ordinary living is more artful than ordinarily supposed.

It is the work of rehearsals to prepare the strips of behavior so that when expressed by performers these strips seem spontaneous, authentic, unrehearsed. I don't mean unrehearsed only in the ways familiar to Western naturalism. Authenticity is a display of harmony/mastery of whatever style is being played, Chekhov or Chikamatsu. For the Brechtian actor to show that he is acting is no less difficult than for the Stanislavskian actor not to show he is acting. During rehearsals a past is assembled out of bits of actual experience, fantasies, historical research, past performances. Or a known score is recalled and replayed. Earlier rehearsals and/or performances quickly become the reference points, the building blocks of performances. Useful recollections are not of "how it was" but of "how we used to do it." The "it" is not the event but earlier rehearsals or performances. Soon reference back to the original—if there was an original—is irrelevant. How Christ offered his disciples wine and matzo at the Last Supper (a seder) is irrelevant to the performance of the Eucharist. The Roman Catholic church ceremony has its own performance history. The language of church ceremony has never been the language Christ spoke, Aramaic-Hebrew. Nor are the gestures or costumes of the priests modeled on Christ's. And if the church had chosen another of Christ's gestures as the keystone of the Mass—say, the laying on of hands to heal the sick—this would have developed its own traditional scripts. Indeed, in some Pentecostal churches the laying on of hands is the key representation of Christ, the demonstration of His presence. Or it may be speaking in tongues, dancing, or taking up serpents. Each of these scripts has developed its own way of being performed. What happens over years and centuries to the various church services happens much more quickly during rehearsals.

This is not just a thing of the West. John Emigh reports an example of $1 \rightarrow 5_a \rightarrow 5_b$ from the Sepik River area of Papua New Guinea. In the village of Magendo, sometime before the performance Emigh saw, an uninitiated boy named Wok wandered into the men's House Tamboran (forbidden to the uninitiated) and died. The story goes that a bird came to the boy's mother in a dream and told her what had happened and where to find Wok's body. The mother accused her brother of causing Wok's death. She said her brother had painted a dangerous spirit image in the House Tamboran. The brother accepted the blame, the house was torn down, a new one built, and the spirit

of Wok resided in the new house. Wok is also credited by the villagers with teaching them how to build better canoes, how to catch fish, and how to plant crops. Emigh goes on:

Now there are several things about this story and its preparation for the event at hand that I find fascinating. First is the immediate and physical sense of relationship between past and present. The old House Tamboran stood *there* across the swamp. The reeds the child was found in were over *here*—people are very specific about the geography involved, and also about improvements in village life made possible by the intervention of Wok's spirit. Performing the dance at this time would be an act of renewal, of reconnection of past and present.⁵

But what's rehearsal at Magendo like? How does it use the material of Wok's story?

As the rehearsal proceeded an old man would stop the singing from time to time to make suggestions on style or phrasing, or, just as often, just as much a part of the event being rehearsed, he would comment on the meaning of the song words, on the details of the story. The rehearsal was at once remarkably informal and absolutely effective.

Questions of performing style are combined with interpretations of the story. The historical-legendary Wok is being transformed into his dance. A virtual or nonevent in the past—which, I grant, may have been itself based on something that happened, a dead child—is made into a concrete, actual present. But this is rehearsal: the present is something being made "for tomorrow," for the future when the dance will be danced.

As the rehearsal proceeded men and women would occasionally drift by. The assembled singers, drummers, and witnesses practiced the movements of the dance that accompanies the mother's lament. Lawrence, a school-teacher who spoke English, explained that this was an "imitative" dance, a dance in which both men and women imitated the movements of birds performing activities that loosely correlated to the events described in the mother's lament.

Wok is represented by his mother's lament—and the lament is represented by dancers, both men and women—and they are dancing as birds.

The dancers imitate birds because the clan the story is significant to is a bird clan, has a bird as its totem. The story is at once distanced—put at an artistic remove—by the translation of the woman's lament into gestures performed by both men and women acting as birds and made more immediate in its impact on all the people of the village by this artistic displacement.

"More immediate" because the bird clan exists now. A woman's lament for a murdered son is transformed into a dance of men and women imitating